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Should monetary policy respond to asset prices?  This is a classic question in 
monetary policy.  This paper addresses this issue in the context of a general equilibrium 
model with nominal rigidities. Our focus is on equilibrium determinacy. 
  Bernanke and Gertler (1999,2001) address the efficacy of a central bank response to 
asset prices in the model outlined in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (2000). In their sticky  
price model a shock to asset prices increases aggregate demand and thus drives up the price 
level. Bernanke and Gertler conclude that there is no need for a direct central bank response 
to asset prices because a central bank that is responding to general price inflation is already 
responding to asset price movements.  They state:  “Policy should not respond to asset prices, 
except insofar as they signal changes in expected inflation.” 
Cecchetti, Genberg, Lipsky, and Wadhwani (2000), however, argue that central banks, 
at least in inflation targeting countries, should respond to asset prices: "[a] central bank 
concerned with hitting an inflation target at a given time horizon, and achieving as smooth a 
path as possible for inflation, is likely to achieve superior performance by adjusting its policy 
instruments not only to inflation (or to its inflation forecast) and the output gap, but to asset 
prices as well.” [Page 2] 
Whether or not the central bank can potentially make the economy better off by 
responding to asset prices in a judicious way seems to be jumping ahead of the game. 
Elsewhere we have argued (Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001a)) that the focus on monetary policy 
should not be in finding the optimal rule, but to first ensure that any proposed rule does no 
harm.  The problem is that by following a rule in which the central bank responds to 
  1endogenous variables, the central bank may introduce real indeterminacy and sunspot 
equilibria into an otherwise determinate economy.
1  These sunspot fluctuations are welfare-
reducing and can potentially be quite large.   
Asset prices reflect market forecasts of current and future profitability. For a central 
bank responding to asset prices, this presents a potential problem from the perspective of 
equilibrium determinacy. Firm profitability is negatively related to costs of production. In a 
model with sticky prices, the underlying distortion is the level of marginal cost. As marginal 
cost falls, the price mark-up rises, implying greater monopoly power. Equilibrium 
determinacy is more likely if the central bank responds positively to the underlying distortion, 
i.e., raises the nominal rate with increases in marginal cost. But by responding positively to 
asset prices the central bank is responding negatively to marginal cost, thus making real 
equilibrium indeterminacy more likely.   
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next two sections we lay out the benchmark 
sticky price model and demonstrate the possibility of equilibrium indeterminacy. One 
criticism of this benchmark model is that in response to a monetary tightening (an increase in 
the nominal rate), marginal cost falls so sharply that profits actually rise. To counter this 
criticism, we next add sticky wages to the basic model and demonstrate that equilibrium 
indeterminacy may still arise even if profits do not behave in a counterfactual fashion.  
Finally, we consider the alternative “cash-in-advance” money demand timing suggested by 
Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001a). We demonstrate that under this timing assumption equilibrium 
indeterminacy arises for a central bank targeting share prices even if prices are relatively 
                                                           
1 The term “sunspot” is in one sense misleading since these shocks are accommodated by the money supply 
movements needed to support the interest rate policy.  But we use the term since the central bank introduces real 
indeterminacy by responding to public expectations which can be driven by sunspots. 
  2flexible. Even with fairly flexible prices, very modest share price targeting will produce 
indeterminacy in this model variant. The final section concludes. 
 
2. The Benchmark Model. 
The theoretical model consists of households and firms.  We will discuss the decision 
problems of each in turn.  Since we are interested in issues of local equilibrium determinacy 
we will restrict our analysis to a deterministic model. 
2.a.  Households. 
  Households are infinitely lived, discounting the future at rate β .  Their period-by-period 
utility function is given by 
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M 1 + denotes real cash balances that can facilitate time-t transactions.  The household begins 
period t with Mt cash balances, Bt-1 one-period nominal bonds that pay Rt-1 gross interest, and 
Nt-1 shares of stock that sell at price Qt and pay dividend Dt.  With Wt denoting the real wage, 
Pt the price level, and Xt the time-t monetary injection, the household’s intertemporal budget 
constraint is given by 
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The stock shares are shares in the ownership of firms, and the dividends are the corresponding 
profit flow.   
  3We are assuming what Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001a) call “cash-when-I’m-done 
timing” (CWID).  That is, the cash balances that the household has in its time-t utility 
functional are the cash balances the household has after carrying out time-t goods 
transactions. As a form of sensitivity analysis we will consider “cash-in-advance” (CIA) 
timing below.   
  The household’s optimization conditions include the following: 
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2.b. Firms. 
  The firms in the model utilize labor services   from households to produce the final 
good using the linear technology: 
t L
t t L Y = .  The firm is a monopolistic producer of these goods 
implying that labor will be paid below its marginal  product.  Let Zt denote marginal cost so 
that we have  .  The variable Z t t Z W = t is the monopoly distortion as it measures how far the 
firm’s marginal product of unity differs from the real wage.  In the case of perfectly flexible 
but monopolistic prices, Zt = Z is constant and less than unity.  The smaller is Z, the greater is 
  4the monopoly power.  In the case of sticky prices, Zt is variable and moves in response to the 
real and nominal shocks hitting the economy. Yun (1996) demonstrates that in log deviations 
nominal price adjustment is given by: 
1 + + = t t t z βπ λ π           (6) 
where t π is time-t nominal price growth (as a deviation from steady-state nominal price 
growth) and lower case zt denotes the log deviation from steady-state. 
As noted above, the firm’s profits are paid out as dividends to the shareholders.  For 
simplicity we assume that the measure of firms is equal to the measure of households.  Hence 
we have that the dividend payment is given by the profits of the typical firm:    t t t Y Z D ) 1 ( − =
 
2.c. Equilibrium. 
  There are five markets in this theoretical model: the labor market, the goods market, 
the asset market, the bond market, and the money market.  The respective market-clearing 
conditions include:  ,  , and  t t L C = 1 = t N 0 = t B .  The money market clears with the 
household holding the per capita money supply intertemporally.  In what follows we assume 
that monetary policy is defined by a path for the gross nominal interest rate .  In log 
deviations the monetary policy rule is given by  
t R
t q t t q R τ τπ + = ,           ( 7 )  
where qt denotes log deviations in the share price.  The implied money supply behavior (the 
Xt process) is passive and can be backed out of the first order condition for money holdings.  
 
2.d. Log-linearizing the model. 
  5It is convenient to express the equilibrium in terms of log-deviations from the steady-
state.  We will use lower-case letters to denote log deviations from the steady-state. 
t t t w l c = +γ σ           ( 8 )  
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Equation (10) implies that share prices depend upon the discounted stream of all future 
dividends.  As for dividends, (8) and (12)-(13) can be combined to yield 
, t t Az d − =            ( 1 4 )  
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.  For all plausible calibrations we have that A > 0.  We will 
henceforth assume that this restriction holds.  Since a positive innovation in the interest rate (a 
monetary contraction) will decrease marginal cost, the assumption of A > 0 implies that 
profits will increase with positive interest rate innovations.   This counterfactual implication is 
a well-known critique of models in which sticky-prices are the only nominal rigidity.  We will 
return to this issue below. 
  Under the policy rule (7), the central bank is responding negatively to the discounted 
stream of all future marginal costs.  As noted earlier, this negative element to the rule 
suggests that equilibrium determinacy may be a problem.   
  6 
3. Equilibrium Determinacy 
3.a. Equilibrium determinacy with sticky prices. 
  We now consider the parameter restrictions on τ and τq that ensure determinacy of the 






























































































Note that if τq = 0, the system separates so that qt has no effect on πt and zt, although the latter 
two variables do of course affect share prices.  It is straightforward to demonstrate that in this 
case τ > 1 is necessary and sufficient for equilibrium determinacy. 
  The above dynamic system has three eigenvalues.  For equilibrium determinacy all 
three must lie outside the unit circle.  It is straightforward to demonstrate that one is equal to 
1/β.  Let F(x) denote the remaining quadratic.  It is given by: 
0
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A necessary condition for determinacy is that F(-1) and F(1) be of the same sign.  Since F is 
decreasing in this range, this is both a necessary and sufficient condition for determinacy. We 
thus have two cases, F(-1) > F(1) > 0 and F(1) < F(-1) < 0 .  These values are given by: 
  7 
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If F(-1) > 0 (this is the case for all reasonable calibrations), a necessary and sufficient 
condition for determinacy is that F(1) > 0.  If F(-1) < 0 we always have determinacy. 
Combining we find that there is indeterminacy if and only if 
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For reasonable parameter values, (15) is the relevant constraint.  Hence, we have local 
indeterminacy for values of τq in excess of  .  There are two points worth noting about this 
bound. First it is proportional to τ - 1. Reacting aggressively enough to inflation ensures that 
responding to share prices will not create indeterminacy. Secondly as β approaches unity, 
indeterminacy is also not a problem. This can be understood by noting that when β=1 the 
impact of dividends drops out of the model (see (10)). 
p
q τ
To analyze the likelihood of indeterminacy, consider the following parameter values:  
β = .99, σ = γ = 2, z = .9, λ = .019, and τ = 1.5.  In this case we have that there is 
indeterminacy whenever τq >.109.  Note that if prices are less sticky, say λ = .19, the bound 
increases to 1.09.
2
                                                           
2 There is considerable uncertainty about the value of this parameter. Our baseline number of 0.019 comes from 
Woodford (2003), page 347. 
  8  Bullard and Mitra (2002) report the determinacy bound for a sticky price model in 
which the central bank responds to the output gap and inflation. In the current context their 
interest rate rule is given by 
t z t t z R τ τπ + = . 
Under this rule, the necessary and sufficient condition for determinacy is given by 
0 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( > − + − z τ β τ λ . In comparison, (15) implies that the determinacy condition is 
0 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( > − − − q Aτ β τ λ . As emphasized above, targeting share prices is very similar to 
negatively responding to marginal cost.  The amplification effect of the “A” term comes from 
the fact that dividends are a multiple of marginal cost (see (14)). Thus for the issue of 
equilibrium determinacy, reacting to share prices is equivalent to reacting to dividends. 
 
3.b. Equilibrium determinacy with sticky wages. 
We now consider the polar opposite model of nominal rigidity: flexible prices, but 
sticky nominal wages. Such a model may deliver differing determinacy results because firm 
profits, and thus share prices, move oppositely with the monopoly power of workers. Unlike 
the sticky price model, in a sticky wage model profits will fall with positive interest rate 
innovations. Given that profits are now responding in the empirically plausible direction, is 
indeterminacy still a possibility? 
Following Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000), we assume that households are 
monopolistic suppliers of labor and that nominal wages are adjusted in a Calvo-style (1983).   
In this case labor supply behavior is given by 
t t t t W Zh L C =
γ σ .            (17) 
  9The variable Zht is the monopoly distortion as it measures how far the household’s marginal 
rate of substitution is from the real wage.  In the case of perfectly flexible but monopolistic 
wages, Zht = Zh is constant and less than unity.  The smaller is Zh, the greater is the 
monopoly power.  In the case of sticky wages, Zht is variable and moves in response to the 
real and nominal shocks hitting the economy.  Erceg et al. (2000) demonstrate that in log 




t zh 1 + + = βπ λ π           (18) 
where  is time-t net nominal wage growth (in log deviations).  In this case the 
deterministic system is given by (7), (18) and: 
W
t π
t t t zh l c = +γ σ           ( 1 9 )
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Note that  .   Thus, scrolling the system forward one period we have  1 , ≥ = + + j for j t
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If this system is determinate at t+1 we can count equations and unknowns to show that the 
system at time t is also determinate. The system above is isomorphic to the case of sticky 
prices, with one key difference.  Solving for dividends as a function of the monopoly 
distortion we have: 











.           (25) 
In sharp contrast to the case of sticky prices, dividends now respond positively to movements 
in the nominal wage distortion (recall that a higher zht implies a decline in monopoly power 
by workers).  This suggests that responding positively to share prices will not generate 
indeterminacy. Unlike the sticky price model, profits now fall with positive interest rate 
innovations. 
In matrix form the system is identical to the sticky price model except for the term 










































































































with the characteristic equation 
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Note that F is convex, F(0) > 0, and F’(1) < 0.  A necessary and sufficient condition for 
determinacy is that F(1) be positive.  It is given by: 
 
βσ
τ γ σ λ β τ ) 1 )( ( ) 1 (
) 1 (
− + + −
=
W
q F  
With τ > 1, this is the case for all values of τq > 0.   
Hence, in a model with sticky nominal wages but perfectly flexible nominal prices, 
asset price targeting is not prone to indeterminacy.  The reason is that in the case of sticky 
wages a central bank responding positively to asset prices is also responding positively to the 
underlying labor market distortion. 
 
3.c. Equilibrium determinacy with sticky prices and wages. 
  The previous results suggest that we should examine the model with both forms of 
nominal stickiness. In this case, there are two distortions arising from the monopoly power of 
firms and the monopoly power of workers.  The first distortion is proxied by marginal cost 
, while the second is given by the mark-up of real wages over the household’s marginal 

















          ( 2 6 )  
Note how dividends are related to the underlying distortions.  By responding to asset prices 
the central bank is responding positively to one distortion but negatively to the other.   
  12  There are two issues for this section. First, can real indeterminacy arise when both 
forms of nominal rigidity are present?  Second, can real indeterminacy arise even if profits 
respond positively to a monetary expansion (a decline in the nominal rate)?  We first turn to 
the determinacy analysis. 
The dynamic system is now a 5
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There is one state variable so that determinacy requires four explosive roots and one root 
within the unit circle.  As before, one root is always 1/β > 1, so that we are left with a quartic 
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We also have that F2 > 0.  For determinacy, we need one root in the unit circle.  Since F is 
convex at zero, and F”’(1) > 0, we know that at least two roots lie to the right of one.  Hence, 
a necessary and sufficient condition for determinacy is that F(1) and F(-1) are of the opposite 
sign.  These are given by: 
σ β
β λ γ σ λ τ γ σ λλ τ
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If F(-1) < 0, then F(1) > 0.  F(-1) can be negative only if Bq < 0. If Bq > 0, then F(-1) > 0, so 
that a necessary and sufficient condition for determinacy is F(1) < 0. Hence we have the 
following bounds for determinacy: If Bq > 0, then there is indeterminacy if and only if  
) 1 )( ) ( ( ) ( ) 1 ( β λ γ σ λ τ γ σ λλ τ − − + + + − A W q W >  0.      (27) 
Assuming τ > 1, we can express this as 
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Note that as λW goes to infinity, these bounds collapse to the previous bounds for the sticky 
price model (see (15) and (16)).   
For plausible parameter values, the term Bq will be positive so that condition (27) is 
relevant. Note that Bq > 0 is a much weaker restriction than the corresponding restriction for 
sticky prices ( ) ( ) 1 ( 2 γ σ β βσ + − > A  ). Once again this same bound also occurs if the central 
bank were to respond to dividends (26) instead of share prices. The τq bound in (28) is larger 
than the case of sticky prices and flexible wages but converges to it as ∞ → W λ . As we will 
show below, however, the impact of sticky wages has only a marginal quantitative impact on 
the bound. 
  Let us now return to the profits issue. Can real indeterminacy arise even if profits 
respond positively to a monetary expansion (a decline in the nominal rate)?  Suppose that the 
central bank’s policy rule is given by 
t t q t t q R η τ τπ + + =  
where  t η  is an iid exogenous shock to the nominal rate.  Assume that the model is at the 
steady-state, and consider an iid decrease in the nominal rate ( t η  < 0) such that marginal cost 
increases by zt = 1.  For profits to not respond to this shock we need that 
) ( ) ( γ σ γ σ + = + = A z A zh t t . The remaining equilibrium conditions include: 
t
W
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  1 + + = t t t z βπ λ π .          (32) 
  15If we look at the difference in the price and wage adjustment equations (31)-(32) we have 






t z A π π β λ γ σ λ π π . 
Using (30) we have 
) 1 ( ) ) ( ( 1 − + − + = z
W A ρ β λ γ σ λ  
where  1 0 < < z ρ  denotes a stable root of the dynamic system and thus the decay rate in zt.  If 
there is determinacy there is only one such root.  In the case of indeterminacy, there is more 
than one root to choose from.  In this case we will choose the root that is closest to the single 
root when there is determinacy.   
Rearranging we have that the zero profit condition is given by 
) ( ) 1 ( 1 γ σ λ ρ β λ + = − + +
W
z A . 
If the left-hand side is greater (lesser) than the right-hand side, then profits increase (decrease) 
with a monetary expansion. Note the tension between the ability of profits to increase with a 
monetary expansion and indeterminacy.  For profits to increase and for there to be 
indeterminacy we need  . This does suggest, however, 
that both can occur. 
) 1 ( 1 ) ( 0 z
W A ρ β λ γ σ λ − + < − + <
For example, consider the following numerical experiments.  Woodford reports values 
for the nominal rigidities of λ
W = .035 and λ = .019.
 3  Using these values, and β = .99, σ = γ 
= 2, z = .9, and τ = 1.5, we have that determinacy requires τq < .11.  Note that  W λ  has little 
effect on the τq bound: as we let  ∞ → W λ  this bound drops only to .109.  However, the sticky 
nominal wages improves the profits prediction.  Under this calibration, the profits condition is 
mildly positive:    . 0019 . ) ( ) 1 ( 1 = + − − + + γ σ λ ρ β λ
W
z A
  16Woodford (2003), however, argues for a much lower calibration for the preference 
coefficients:  σ = .16, γ = .47 (the case of “strategic complementarity”).
4  In this case the 
determinacy bound is τq < .145, and profits respond strongly to a monetary expansion:  




3.d. Equilibrium determinacy with CIA Timing. 
  Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001a) have criticized the previous money demand timing 
convention as it reflects “cash-when-I’m-done timing” (CWID).  That is, the cash balances 
that the household has in its time-t utility functional are the cash balances the household has 
after carrying out time-t goods transactions.  As a form of sensitivity analysis we will now 
consider the more intuitive “cash-in-advance” (CIA) timing.  We will restrict our discussion 
to the model with sticky prices and wages.   
  The households’ period-by-period utility function is now given by 
) (
1 1




















          





denotes real cash balances that can 
facilitate time-t transactions.  The household begins period t with Mt cash balances, Bt-1 one-
period nominal bonds that pay Rt-1 gross interest, and Nt-1 shares of stock that sell at price Qt 
and pay dividend Dt.  The asset market opens at the beginning of the period leaving the 
household with the following cash balances for use in the goods market: 
) ( 1 1 1 t t t t t t t t t t t t t D Q N P B N Q P B R X M MM − − − + + + ≡ − − − .      
                                                                                                                                                                                     
3 The coefficients λ and λW are taken from Woodford (2003), page 347. 
  17where Pt is the price level, and Xt denotes the time-t monetary injection.  The household’s 
intertemporal budget constraint is given by 
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The household’s optimization conditions include the following: 
t t t W L C =
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Compared to CWID timing, the key difference is in the Fisher equation (35).  In sharp 
contrast to the case of CWID timing (see (3)), in the case of CIA timing the purchase of a 
bond at time-t lowers household time-t liquidity.  Hence, even in the present case of 
separability between consumption and real balances (Ucm =0), the level of real balances has a 
direct effect on bond pricing.  Seen another way, we can substitute the money demand 
equation into the bond equation and yield: 
1 1 1 / ] [ ] [ +
−
+ +
− = t t t t C R C π β
σ σ          (37) 
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β           (38) 
In comparison to CWID timing, the key difference is the reduced form Fisher equation, (37).  
However, arbitrage between bonds and shares yields the same pricing relationship for share 
prices (38).   
                                                                                                                                                                                     
4 We have the case of strategic complements when σ+γ < 1.  See Woodford (2003), page 165. 
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For simplicity, we will analyze this system for β = 1 and then present numerical results for β 
< 1.  There is one state variable so that determinacy requires four explosive roots and one root 
within the unit circle.  One root is always one which we will treat as explosive, so that we are 






4 ) ( F x F x F x F x x F + + + + ≡ . 
As in the CWID model, F”’(1) < 0, F3 < 0, F1 < 0, F0 > 0.  But the sign of F2 is ambiguous and 
is given by 
)] 3 ( ) ( [ ) )( 1 ( ) 3 ( 2 2 + + + + + + − − + + ≡ W W q W W F λ λ σ γ σ λλ τ γ σ τ λλ λ λ σ . 
  19For now let us assume that F2 > 0 (so that all the roots have positive real parts).  Analogous to 
the CWID proof, we need one root in the unit circle for determinacy, so that a necessary and 
sufficient condition for determinacy is  
0
)] 1 ( [ ) (




τ τ λλ γ σ q W F . 
Assuming F2 > 0, indeterminacy arises if and only if  ) 1 ( − > τ τ q .  Note that if F(1) > 0, then 
we necessarily have F2 > 0 and  
0
) ( )] 1 ( [ ) ( 2
) 1 ( >
+ + − − +
≡ ′
σ
λ λ σ τ τ λλ γ σ W q W F  
so that  ) 1 ( − > τ τ q  is sufficient for indeterminacy.
5  Estimates of τ are typically below 1.5, so 
that τq > .5 implies indeterminacy.  This is in sharp contrast to the CWID model where β = 1 
implied that responding to share prices could never produce indeterminacy.   
We can develop some intuition for these conflicting results by examining the two 
money demand models and the implied links between nominal interest rates and real share 
prices. In the case of CWID timing, the Fisher equation (9) and the share price equation (10) 
can be combined to yield: 
   ] ) 1 [( 1 1 + + ∆ − − + = t t t t c d q q βσ β β       (39) 
where  .  In the case of β =1, we have that  t t t c c c − ≡ ∆ + + 1 1 t t c q σ = .  In this case, the 
nominal interest rate has an effect on share prices only through its effect on consumption and 
thus the real rate.  Substituting the expression for asset prices into the policy rule we have 
                                                           
5 For  ) 1 ( − < τ τq  and F2 < 0, indeterminacy can still arise if τ is sufficiently large.  Carlstrom and Fuerst 
(2001) note that a CIA model with a current-based interest rate rule is isomorphic to a CWID model with a 
forward-based interest rate rule.  Bullard and Mitra (2002) consider the latter and note that indeterminacy arises 
for inflation responses that are too aggressive.   
  20t q t t c R σ τ τπ + = . Because β =1 this rule has the same determinacy conditions as the simpler 
rule where the central bank only responds to inflation,  t t R τπ = , implying that for τ > 1 we 
have determinacy for all  0 ≥ q τ .
Matters are much different in the case of the CIA model.  The Fisher equation (37) can 
now be expressed as 
1 1 1 + + + ∆ − ∆ = − t t t t R c R σ π         (40) 
The nominal rate directly enters this expression because (in this case of CIA timing) real 
money balances matter for bond pricing.  The share price equation can be expressed as: 
  1 1 1 ) 1 ( + + + ∆ + ∆ − − + = t t t t t R c d q q β βσ β β . 
Now we have an additional channel for indeterminacy: Since the current nominal rate directly 
affects the current share price in a negative direction, the central bank’s response to inflation 


















. Once again because β =1 this rule has the same determinacy 









.  Responding to share prices indirectly lowers the central bank’s response to 





 or  1 − >τ τq , indeterminacy arises even holding dividends fixed! 
The assumption of β = 1 is convenient for the above derivations. But because β = 1 is 
equivalent to holding dividends fixed, this assumption completely closes off the channel for 
indeterminacy emphasized in the earlier sections with CWID timing. The actual bounds for 
  21determinacy tighten sharply as we move from β=1 to β = .99. The central bank is once again 
responding to dividends or negatively to marginal cost as in (26). For example, with σ = γ = 
2, z = .9, λ
W = .035, λ = .019, and τ = 1.5, we have that determinacy requires τq < .097 
(compared to .11 with CWID). Using Woodford’s calibration for the preference coefficients, 
σ = .16, γ = .47, we have a share price bound of τq < .12 (compared to .145 with CWID).
6   
The difference between the CIA and CWID bounds, however, becomes more 
significant as we move to a more flexible price/wage economy. Suppose we increase the 
nominal adjustment coefficients by a factor of ten: λ
W = .35, λ = .19.  With β = . 99, σ = γ = 
2, z = .9, and τ = 1.5, we have that determinacy requires τq < .35 for the CIA model.  In the 
case of CWID, the bound is τq < 1.1.  Using Woodford’s preference calibration, σ = .16, γ = 
.47, the CIA bound is τq < .37, while the CWID bound is τq < 1.45. 
 
4. Conclusion. 
  The celebrated Taylor rule (1993) posits that central bank behavior can be described 
by a fairly simple rule linking nominal rate movements to movements in inflation and output.  
This seminal paper has spawned a large literature concerned with issues of stability: under 
what situations can a Taylor-rule formulation of monetary policy create real indeterminacy 
and thus sunspot fluctuations in the model economy?  See for example, Benhabib, Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (2001), Bernanke and Woodford (1997), Carlstrom and Fuerst 
(2001a,2001b,2004), Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000), and Kerr and King (1996).   
The current paper extends this literature in a natural direction.  Many have suggested 
that the central bank should adjust policy in response to asset price movements.  If we put 
                                                           
6 The conditions for profits are identical to the earlier case with CWID timing.   
  22such a response into a Taylor rule, is equilibrium indeterminacy more or less likely?  The 
answer appears to be “more.” If wages and prices are quite sticky, as is typically calibrated, 
the possibility of indeterminacy is quantitatively relevant irrespective of money demand 
timing. With more flexible prices and wages, the possibility of indeterminacy is less likely 
with CWID timing, but remains quantitatively relevant for CIA timing. 
  In their defense of a central bank response to asset prices, Cecchetti, Genberg, Lipsky, 
and Wadhwani (2000) argue that “…reacting to asset prices in the normal course of policy-
making will reduce the likelihood of asset price bubbles forming, thus reducing the risk of 
boom-bust investment cycles." [Page 2]  Bubbles are of course non-fundamental movements 
in asset prices. The moral of this paper is almost the polar opposite of Cecchetti et al. By 
reacting to asset prices, the central bank can inadvertently introduce real indeterminacy and 
thus sunspot equilibria into the economy.  Hence by trying to avoid bubbles, the central bank 
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